India's Economic Growth: Puzzles, Issues, Sustainability

Economic growth has taken off in India. But among economists, there are a variety of puzzles about when growth really took off, why it took off, and thus about how sustainable the growth will be.  Ashok Kotwal, Bharat Ramaswami, and Wilima Wadhwa seek to untangle these issues in "Economic Liberalization and
Indian Economic Growth: What’s the Evidence?" which appears in the December 2011 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature.  (The journal is not freely available on-line, but many students and faculty will have on-line access through their library, or as part of their membership in the American Economic Association.)

Much of the controversy over India's growth arises because certain dates don't line up neatly. India undertook a highly publicized wave of deregulation and market-opening starting in 1991. Main steps included a sharp reduction in limits on imports and on foreign direct investment into India, as well backing away from state control of many industries, including notably banking, insurance, and telecommunications.  However, the surge of economic growth in India predated that wave of reforms--thus leading to controversy over the role of those reforms in the surge of economic growth. The first figure shows the rising level of growth in India's overall GDP; the next figure shows the break from trend in per capita GDP. In both cases, it certainly looks as if the upswing started in the 1980s, rather than after 1991.

India's growth pattern is clearly not the same growth pattern that has worked across east Asia: including Japan, countries like Korea and the other east Asian "tigers," and now China. Their growth was built on sky-high rates of national savings, which translated into enormous capital investment. It was also built on a widespread commitment to raising levels of education, and to transferring technology into the country. The governments of these countries then offered support for what started out as low-wage manufacturing directed at export markets, in which workers moved from agriculture to manufacturing, and then gradually worked up to higher-wage manufacturing.

In contrast, as the JEL authors explain (footnotes omitted): "However, Indian economic growth, during 1980–2004, seems to have little in common with the so-called “Asian Model.” Its savings rate has improved over time but has not reached the East Asian level. Its growth so far has not been driven by manufactured
exports. Nor has it attracted massive  inflows of foreign investment. There is no industrial policy targeted toward developing  specific industries. On the contrary, it is the service sector that has led the charge in
the Indian growth experience. Another aspect of the Indian experience that makes it very different from that of other Asian countries is that, despite a fast growing nonagricultural part of the economy, the share of agriculture in the total labor force has declined very slowly.  In fact, the agricultural labor force in absolute
numbers has increased since the 1980s, dampening the process of poverty decline."

There are competing interpretations of what happened to India's economy in the 1980s. One view is that the growth of that decade was largely an unsustainable bubble based on unsustainably high government deficits. Another view is that the country was already going to through an attitudinal shift away from the overt socialism of the 1970s, and so that even before the reforms of 1991, seeds of economic change were bearing fruit. Those who want chapter and verse on this dispute can start with the fair-minded presentations of both sets of argument in the JEL article.Here, I'll focus on the take-off of services in India, and the concern that growth from this source is not spreading across India's economy..

The cenrrality of services in India's economic growth is quite clear: "Within the sector, business services (which includes software and information-technology-enabled services), banking, and communications have grown on average at more than 10 percent per year in the 1990s. On the other hand, some other services, such as railways and public administration, have grown more slowly ... As a result, while the services share of GDP is nearly 60 percent, its share of  employment is barely 30 percent. ...However, the most noticeable feature of service sector growth  has been the remarkable expansion of its exports, which grew faster (at 17.3 percent annually) than either GDP (at 7.5 percent) or the services GDP through the 1990s (at 9.2 percent). ... Until the most recent financial crisis, this sector has been growing at 35 percent per annum. Though as yet software sector is only a small part of the GDP and a negligible part of the total employment, it has been the most dynamic sector in India ..."

It seems clear that the wave of deregulation in 1991--which allowed imports of high tech equipment, investment by foreign companies (like software companies), along with economic connections to other countries in telecommunications, banking, and finance-- was essential to the growth of India's services sector.
But India's surge of economic growth also came out of some other factors. The country had built up a reservoir of highly-skilled engineers back in the 1970s and 1980s, many of who had educational and commercial connections in high-income economies, and who were thus ready to take advantage of the economic openings when they occurred. A huge number of potential workers in India spoke English, and thus could provide various kinds of administrative support and staff "call centers."


The ironic outcome is that India is typically referred to as a development success story, while at the same time the country has a larger number of the world's poor than any other.Indeed, there are concerns that India is not educating much of its population nearly well enough for it to have any hope of participating in this form of economic growth.  In a phrase I once heard, India is part southern California, and part sub-Saharan Africa. Here is a flavor of the summing up from Kotwal, Ramaswami, and Wadhwa:

"It is clear from the earlier sections that the growth episode in India since the 1980s is not another instance of state-driven growth in Asia. Instead, it is the coincidence  of the ready availability of new technologies and having the skilled manpower that would be necessary to take advantage of these new technologies. Technology transfers in the 1980s and early 1990s took place mostly through easier and cheaper access to imported machinery that was made possible by trade liberalization. Improved communications (especially cell phones) and the diffusion of the Internet were other technologies that played a big role in driving growth from the mid-1990s on. It is inconceivable that, without the breakup of government monopolies and the advent of competition in the communication sector, there would have been a revolution in communication technology in India. ...

"Indeed, one major feature of India’s development pattern is that the share of agriculture in employment has not come down rapidly. In fact, the absolute amount of labor in agriculture has risen continuously in India while it fell in all countries now developed during their comparable development phases. An important component of growth—moving labor from low to high productivity activities—has been conspicuous by its absence in India. Also, as the labor to land ratio grows, it becomes that much more difficult to increase agricultural wages and reduce poverty. ...

"If we consider double the poverty level ($2.16 per day), a staggering 80 percent of India’s population was poor in 1983 and the number is about the same in 2004. This is a startling fact and indicates that there are two Indias: one of educated managers and engineers who have been able to take advantage of the opportunities made available through globalization and the other—a huge mass of undereducated people who are making a living in low productivity jobs in the informal sector—the largest of which is still “agriculture.” The most direct impact on the second India could only come about through improvements in agricultural productivity. ...  In general, the productivity improvements in the informal sector depend crucially on access to credit, know-how, and skills and therefore on the quality of institutions. India’s future will depend a great deal on how these institutional improvements shape up."

India's Economic Strength Compared To China

Why is China the “workshop of the world” when Indian labour is even cheaper and her entrepreneurs admired worldwide? There are many reasons, including (until recently) the anti-foreign-trade policies and small-scale industry reservation policies as well as poor infrastructure in power, roads, water and ports. Perhaps even more important are the restrictive labour laws and certain other regulations, which encourage Indian manufacturing units to “stay small”, thereby forgoing the classic industrial economies of scale and scope.

Both China and India have sizable population, both are seeing a growing middle class by improving the economic livelihood of those in the rural areas. Yet as an economic engine or superpower, India seems to be bogged down by certain factors. The biggest division is that one is state planned centralised economy while the other is probably to most democratised country in Asia with many "almost independently managed states". However, thats the big picture, the reality would show that India's economy is more powerful and resilient in many ways when compared to China.

As a percentage of GDP, China's domestic consumption is the lowest of all major economies, hovering at just 1/3 of GDP. Most of China's growth in 2009 had come from infrastructure spending or speculation in domestic assets. In India, the domestic consumption accounts for 2/3 of GDP - now that is food for thought. China's artificial suppression of the yuan restricts domestic spending. As great as the surpluses are, more than 3/4 of China's capital goes to the 120,000 state controlled entities. That being the case, most of the profits in China end up in state coffers.

The OECD’s Investment Policy Review of India says India has designed policies to encourage investment as part of market-oriented reforms since 1991 that have paved the way for improved prosperity.

“Restrictions on large-scale investment have been greatly relaxed. Many sectors formerly reserved to the public sector have been opened up to private enterprise. Import substitution and protectionism have been replaced by an open trade regime,” the OECD report notes.

But further reforms are needed. India’s policy framework for FDI still remains restrictive compared with most OECD countries. Meanwhile, its investment needs remain massive, with poor infrastructure holding back improvements in both living conditions and productivity.

India’s growth is led by domestic demand and growing incomes in the coming years will continue to boost domestic demand and industrial activity. Reforms, the growth of home-grown corporations and rising scale of foreign direct investment are also pluses. Large domestic savings (37% of GDP in 2007), both by households and corporations, have played a pivotal role in India's economic growth. High domestic savings and the development of homegrown corporations have boosted investment (39% of GDP in 2007), helped by cheap foreign capital. Combined with a large private consumption (55% of GDP in 2007) base and a low trade dependence (imports and exports account for around 20% of GDP), the Indian economy is perceived by foreign investors as a "domestic demand-led story".

Due to the economic slowdown in 2008, household savings in financial assets fell to 10.9% of GDP in 2008 from 11.5% in the previous two years led by the large decline in holdings of shares and debentures. Households also shifted their savings from mutual funds to bank deposits due to an increase in risk aversion in 2008. With the decline in risk aversion in 2009, households will slowly shift back to equities. India's gross domestic saving rate might have declined from 37.7% in 2007 to 31% in 2008-09.

Indis' middle class stands at a formidable 300m while China's figure is around 150m. Half of China's population is in rural areas while India still have 2/3 of them in rural areas. According to a recent study by MIT School of Management, China's absolute levels of poverty and illiteracy have doubled since 2000, while India's have been halved! In India, economic growth in rural areas have outpaced growth in urban areas by 40%. Rural India now accounts for half of India's GDP, it was 42% in 1982, and it contibutes about 2/3 of India's growth . Rural China accounts for only 1/3 of China's GDP, and contributed to just 15% of the country's growth.

Increasing the growth potential and attaining the Chinese type of economic growth is constrained by India's democratic set-up, which requires political consensus to implement economic reforms. Coalition governments in the recent years have slowed the approval of reform and liberalization-oriented legislations. However, policymakers argue that slow and sequenced reforms and liberalization over the years have in fact helped India achieve strong and sustainable economic growth and limited the impact of global cues on the Indian economy.

India's medium term challenges include reducing dependence on foreign oil, increase efficiency in oil consumption to reduce its impact on fiscal and trade deficits. Cutting down oil and agriculture subsidies to reduce unproductive fiscal spending and large budget gap. Structural reforms include improving agriculture yields, development of infrastructure, health care and education access to increase absorptive capacity of economy. Other challenges include: The stance on Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) and capital inflows, and managing their role in generating credit and asset bubbles. Balancing private sector and foreign investors' role with concerns about social stability. Reducing corruption, and income and wealth inequality, especially between states and between rural and urban areas. Boosting human capital development and job creation can raise consumer spending, especially for the lower and middle income groups and in rural areas. Liberalizing foreign investment caps, broadening and deepening the domestic capital markets, easing capital controls on companies to borrow from abroad, and improving financial intermediation of domestic savings can buoy investment.

We should reconsider India in relation to China in their path to dominating the global economic scene over the next 20 years. Both will be taking very different path and will have major consequences to the global competitive paradigm. China's still lags in a several areas and the rural dislocation and to a certain extent the "forgotten group" being left behind will have grave social and economic costs in the coming years, if not properly managed and improved on.

p/s photos: Asin

The Nasties Of Hot Money In Asia

Is there "hot money" in the system? Yes, the Fed's and ECB's low interest rates policy has already started the USD carry trade a few months back, and it could add a Euro carry trade to its banner soon. So, where do you think the money is headed or has been residing? Its Asia. The easy way to see where it has been headed over the past few months is to look at Asia's strongest currency this year. At the top of the heap was the Indonesian rupiah, followed by the Korean won and then the Indian rupee. So much so that the central banks at South Korea and Indonesia have expressed strong concerns over the inflow of hot money into their system. Beware of the current gains you have been seeing in stocks, property and currency in these two countries. They could just as easily disappear overnight. It also appears that the new favoured son by these carry trades is Taiwan.

Hence, we may well appreciate the efforts of Bank Negara a bit more over the past 18 months because Zeti refused to join in the bandwagon to "allow" the ringgit to appreciate too much. Rightly or wrongly, much of the hot money bypassed Malaysia and the ringgit because the ringgit is still not "that accessible and free-floated". By maintaining a disciplined approach, Bank Negara has basically staved off any future problems that may have to do with hot money moving too fast into the system and then too fast out of the system.

Many have been wondering why the Malaysian markets did not rise by as much as their regional peers. In fact Malaysian stock market has been in the bottom quartile in performance when compared to other Asian bourses. A huge part of the answer lies in the currency issue just discussed. Safe to say that taking that point further, we may argue that much of the rise in asset prices in other Asian markets may have been mostly "inflated" by the liquidity rush.

Is the region in grave danger of a collapse when these funds exit? What would cause the funds to exit? Well, if the Fed starts to raise rates, not likely over the next 6 months at least. Well, if there is a fresh war or political instability somewhere that causes people to rush to the reserve currency, and/or a massive jump towards risk aversion. The key I guess, is to monitor the rumblings and big trades in USD and the interest rate policy discussions.

On November 10, 2009, Taiwan's Financial Supervisory Commission barred foreign investors from parking their money in time deposits after bringing funds into the country. Plus, foreign investors will not be allowed to extend the deposit maturity beyond three months. Until now, foreign investors were allowed to deposit 30% of the inflows in time deposits for three months with a possible extension for another three months. Portfolio investors can still invest 30% of the net inflows in government bonds, money market instruments, money market funds and derivatives. As of October 2009, foreign investors had parked US$15.5 billion in Taiwan dollar accounts, almost five times the level considered appropriate by the central bank. The central bank has voiced concerns that beside investing in Taiwanese stocks, foreign investors were putting money into Taiwan Dollar deposits to earn interest plus currency arbitrage given the appreciating Taiwan dollar.

The move follows large capital inflows into Taiwan's dollar accounts recently which is putting upward pressure on the Taiwan Dollar and hurting export competitiveness. The central bank has been intervening in the FX market and had recently hinted at capital controls to contain currency strength.

This need not be an explosive issue as it seems that the central bankers in the affected countries are aware of the situation. The danger is when the central bankers do not have the political will to act as they should, or they act too slow to temper the liquidity inflow. One can easily reduce the inflow with various measures, so as to minimise the ill-effects of withdrawal of these kind of hot money.

Funnily, the US Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia president Charles Plosser said that the capital flows into Asia are a result of a stronger recovery in the region. He added that the flows are not such that he would consider them to be threatening or inconsistent with fundamentals. OMG, the danger is when enough people in high places in Asia believe that diatribe. These are not long term FDI, its short term, its a play on currency outlook and interest rate differentials, is short term - how in the world can Plosser say its not threatening. It can move asset prices up by 30%-50% in 6 months, and we know its seriously never going to be long term, so when they exit, how can Plosser say that it won't be threatening???!!!


p/s photos: Reon Kadena

Asia Rising - Part Three

"Dictatorship Has Given Asia an Advantage."

No. Autocracies, mainly in East Asia, may seem to have made their countries prosperous. The so-called dragon economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia under Suharto, and now China experienced their fastest growth under nondemocratic regimes. Frequent comparisons between China and India appear to support the view that a one-party state unencumbered by messy competitive politics can deliver economic goods better than a multiparty system tied down by too much democracy.

But Asia also has had many autocracies that have impoverished their countries-consider the tragic list of Burma, Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, Cambodia under the murderous Khmer Rouge, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. Even China is a mixed example. Before the Middle Kingdom emerged from self-imposed isolation and totalitarian rule in 1976, its economic growth was subpar. China under Mao also had the dubious distinction of producing the world's worst famine.

Even when you look at autocracies credited with economic success, you find two interesting facts. First, their economic performance improved when they became less brutal and allowed greater personal and economic freedoms. Second, the keys to their successes were sensible economic policies, such as conservative macroeconomic management, infrastructural investment, promotion of savings, and pushing exports. Dictatorship really has no magic formula for economic development.

Comparing a one-party state like China with a democracy such as India is not an easy intellectual exercise. Obviously, India has many weaknesses: widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and minimal social services. China appears to have done much better in these areas. But appearances can be deceiving. Dictatorships are good at concealing the problems they create while democracy is good at advertising its defects.

So the autocratic advantage in Asia is, at best, an optical illusion.

"China Will Dominate Asia."

Not likely. China is on course to overtake Japan as the world's second-largest economy this year. As the regional economic hub, China is now driving Asia's economic integration. Beijing's diplomatic influence is expanding as well, supposedly thanks to its newfound soft power. Even China's once antiquated military has acquired a full plethora of new weapons systems and significantly improved its ability to project force.

Although it is true that China will become Asia's strongest country by any measure, its rise has inherent limits. China is unlikely to dominate Asia in the sense that it replaces the United States as the region's peacekeeper and decisively influences other countries' foreign policies. Its economic growth is also by no means guaranteed. Restive secession-minded minorities (Tibetans and Uighurs) inhabit strategically important areas that constitute almost 30 percent of Chinese territory. Taiwan, which is unlikely to return to China's fold anytime soon, ties down substantial Chinese military resources. The ruling Chinese Communist Party, which views perpetuating its one-party state as more important than overseas expansionism, is not likely to be seduced by delusions of imperial grandeur.

China has formidable neighbors in Russia, India, and Japan that will fiercely resist any Chinese attempts to become the regional hegemon. Even Southeast Asia, where China appears to have reaped the most geopolitical gains in recent years, has been reluctant to fall into China's orbit completely. Nor would the United States simply capitulate in the face of a Chinese juggernaut.

For complex reasons, China's rise has inspired fear and unease, not enthusiasm, among Asians. Only 10 percent of Japanese, 21 percent of South Koreans, and 27 percent of Indonesians surveyed by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs said they would be comfortable with China being the future leader of Asia.

So much for China's charm offensive.

p/s photos: Michelle Yip Shuen

Asia Rising - Part Two

"Asian Capitalism Is More Dynamic."

Hardly. With the United States brought low by Wall Street and the European economy enfeebled by its welfare state and inflexible labor market, most Asian economies appear in great shape. It is tempting to say that Asia's unique brand of capitalism, by seamlessly weaving together strategic state intervention, corporate long-term thinking, and insuppressible popular desire for material betterment, will outcompete either the greed-devastated U.S. model or the hidebound European variant.

But though Asian economies-with the notable exception of Japan-are among the fastest-growing in the world today, there's little real evidence to suggest that their apparent dynamism comes from a mysteriously successful form of Asian capitalism. The truth is more mundane: The region's dynamism owes a great deal to its strong fundamentals (high savings, urbanization, and demographics) and the benefits of free trade, market reforms, and economic integration. Asia's relative backwardness is a blessing in one sense: Asian countries have to grow faster because they're starting from a much lower base.

Asian capitalism does have three unique features, but they do not necessarily confer competitive advantages. First, Asian states intervene more in the economy through industrial policy, infrastructural investment, and export promotion. But whether that has made Asian capitalism more dynamic remains an unresolved puzzle. The World Bank's classic 1993 study of the region, "The East Asian Miracle," could not find evidence that strategic intervention by the state is responsible for East Asia's success. Second, two types of companies-family-controlled conglomerates and giant, state-owned enterprises-dominate Asia's business landscape. Although such corporate ownership structures enable Asia's largest companies to avoid the short-termism of most American firms, they also shield them from shareholders and market pressures, making Asian firms less accountable, less transparent, and less innovative.

Finally, Asia's high savings rates, by providing a huge pool of indigenous capital, undeniably fuel the region's economic growth. But pity Asia's savers. Most of them save because their governments provide inadequate social safety nets. Government policies in Asia penalize savers through financial repression (by keeping deposit rates low and paying household savers measly returns on their savings) and reward producers by subsidizing capital (typically through low bank lending rates). Even export promotion, ostensibly an Asian virtue, seems overrated. Asian central banks have invested most of their massive export surpluses in low-yielding, dollar-dominated assets that will lose much of their value due to the long-term inflationary pressures generated by U.S. fiscal and monetary policies.

"Asia Will Lead the World in Innovation."

Not in our lifetime. If you look only at the growing number of U.S. patents awarded to Asian inventors, the United States appears to have a dramatically receding edge in innovation. South Korean inventors, for example, received 8,731 U.S. patents in 2008-compared with 13 in 1978. In 2008, close to 37,000 U.S. patents went to Japanese inventors. The trend seems sufficiently alarming that one study ranked the United States eighth in terms of innovation, behind Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Reports of the death of America's technological leadership are, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly exaggerated. Although Asia's advanced economies, such as Japan and South Korea, are closing the gap, the United States' lead remains huge. In 2008, American inventors were awarded 92,000 U.S. patents, twice the combined total given to South Korean and Japanese inventors. Asia's two giants, China and India, still lag far behind

Asia is pouring money into higher education. But Asian universities will not become the world's leading centers of learning and research anytime soon. None of the world's top 10 universities is located in Asia, and only the University of Tokyo ranks among the world's top 20. In the last 30 years, only eight Asians, seven of them Japanese, have won a Nobel Prize in the sciences. The region's hierarchical culture, centralized bureaucracy, weak private universities, and emphasis on rote learning and test-taking will continue to hobble its efforts to clone the United States' finest research institutions.

Even Asia's much-touted numerical advantage is less than it seems. China supposedly graduates 600,000 engineering majors each year, India another 350,000. The United States trails with only 70,000 engineering graduates annually. Although these numbers suggest an Asian edge in generating brainpower, they are thoroughly misleading. Half of China's engineering graduates and two thirds of India's have associate degrees. Once quality is factored in, Asia's lead disappears altogether. A much-cited 2005 McKinsey Global Institute study reports that human resource managers in multinational companies consider only 10 percent of Chinese engineers and 25 percent of Indian engineers as even "employable," compared with 81 percent of American engineers.

p/s photos: Nancy Wu Ding Yan

Asia Rising - Part One

The esteemed Foreign Policy magazine has been putting out great perspectives on the rise of Asia, both as an economic power and militarily, albeit the latter is much more fragmented. The first part looks at the realistic predictions of China or India as economic powers in their own right. While growth rates and population strength have been often cited, its still a long way off.

Asia is nowhere near closing its economic and military gap with the West. The region produces roughly 30 percent of global economic output, but because of its huge population, its per capita gdp is only $5,800, compared with $48,000 in the United States. Asian countries are furiously upgrading their militaries, but their combined military spending in 2008 was still only a third that of the United States. Even at current torrid rates of growth, it will take the average Asian 77 years to reach the income of the average American. The Chinese need 47 years. For Indians, the figure is 123 years. And Asia's combined military budget won't equal that of the United States for 72 years.

In any case, it is meaningless to talk about Asia as a single entity of power, now or in the future. Far more likely is that the fast ascent of one regional player will be greeted with alarm by its closest neighbors. Asian history is replete with examples of competition for power and even military conflict among its big players. China and Japan have fought repeatedly over Korea; the Soviet Union teamed up with India and Vietnam to check China, while China supported Pakistan to counterbalance India. Already, China's recent rise has pushed Japan and India closer together. If Asia is becoming the world's center of geopolitical gravity, it's a murky middle indeed.

Those who think Asia's gains in hard power will inevitably lead to its geopolitical dominance might also want to look at another crucial ingredient of clout: ideas. Pax Americana was made possible not only by the overwhelming economic and military might of the United States but also by a set of visionary ideas: free trade, Wilsonian liberalism, and multilateral institutions. Although Asia today may have the world's most dynamic economies, it does not seem to play an equally inspiring role as a thought leader. The big idea animating Asians now is empowerment; Asians rightly feel proud that they are making a new industrial revolution. But self-confidence is not an ideology, and the much-touted Asian model of development does not seem to be an exportable product.

"Asia's Rise Is Unstoppable."

Don't bet on it. Asia's recent track record might seem to guarantee its economic superpower status. Goldman Sachs, for instance, expects that China will surpass the United States in economic output in 2027 and India will catch up by 2050.

Given Asia's relatively low per capita income, its growth rate will indeed outpace the West's for the foreseeable future. But the region faces enormous demographic hurdles in the decades ahead. More than 20 percent of Asians will be elderly by 2050. Aging is a principal cause of Japan's stagnation. China's elderly population will soar in the middle of the next decade. Its savings rate will fall while healthcare and pension costs explode. India is a lone exception to these trends-any one of which could help stall the region's growth.

Environmental and natural resource constraints could also prove crippling. Pollution is worsening Asia's shortage of fresh water while air pollution exacts a terrible toll on health (it kills almost 400,000 people each year in China alone). Without revolutionary advances in alternative energy, Asia could face a severe energy crunch. Climate change could devastate the region's agriculture.

The current economic crisis, moreover, will lead to huge overcapacity as Western demand evaporates. Asian companies, facing anemic consumer demand at home, will not be able to sell their products in the region. The Asian export-dependent model of development will either disappear or cease to be a viable engine of growth.

Political instability could also throw Asia's economic locomotive off course. State collapse in Pakistan or a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could wreak havoc. Rising inequality and endemic corruption in China could fuel social unrest and cause its economic growth to sputter. And if a democratic breakthrough somehow forces the Communist Party from power, China is most likely to enter a lengthy period of unstable transition, with a weak central government and mediocre economic performance.

p/s photos: Yuna Ito